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I. INTRODUCTION
A foreign manufacturer sells a product to an American distributor
in State A, who then resells the product to an American consumer in
State B. The consumer is injured by the product and attempts to sue
the foreign manufacturer in State B. Can State B exercise personal
jurisdiction over the manufacturer? This deceptively simple and
seemingly common question, and related questions involving the so-
called "stream of commerce," has fractured the United States Su-
preme Court for over twenty years, leaving consumers, manufacturers,
and distributors unsure of their rights and potential liabilities. This
Article focuses on a recent missed opportunity the Court had to solve
that problem and why two Justices erred in declining to do so.
In 1987 the Court split four to four in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court on the level of "purposeful availment" of a particular
state's laws a foreign manufacturer must engage in to trigger the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer.' Two opin-
ions, each supported by four Justices, presented competing
approaches to this problem. One approach allowed jurisdiction to be
asserted whenever a manufacturer placed its wares into the stream of
commerce with the knowledge or expectation that those goods were
likely to end up in a particular state. Another approach required
"something more" before jurisdiction could be asserted to show that
the manufacturer specifically intended to target the forum at issue.2
This split left lower courts without clear guidance on the issue and
1. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
2. Id. at 111.
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created uncertainty for litigators and companies in an area of the law
that already lacked many bright-line rules.
In 2011 it appeared that the Court would finally clear up the ambi-
guity in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,3 a case with facts and
issues roughly similar to those presented in Asahi. However, the
Court again failed to find five votes for one particular test. A plurality
of four Justices essentially supported the "something more" ap-
proach, 4 while a dissent from three Justices supported something akin
to the "knowledge or expectation" approach outlined in Asahi.5 Jus-
tices Breyer and Alito, concurring in the judgment, declined to choose
between these competing approaches because they felt Nicastro
presented an inappropriate vehicle to decide this issue since it did not
concern issues of modern technology, such as issues raised by the
Internet.
This Article critiques the concurrence by arguing that either of the
competing approaches to the stream of commerce test presented in
Asahi, and reiterated in Nicastro, would be preferable to the current
uncertainty in this area of the law. This Article argues that modern
technology does not significantly change the calculus in this area be-
cause a relatively well-established test for evaluating Internet "con-
tacts" already exists and would be largely unaffected by the choice
between the two approaches to the stream of commerce doctrine.
Part II describes the history of the Supreme Court's modern personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence, starting with International Shoe and ending
with Asahi. Specifically, Part II focuses on the development of two
principles in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence during this period and
the tension between those two concepts: the requirement of pur-
poseful availment and the expansion of the stream of commerce test.
Part III examines Nicastro itself and the reaction to that decision.
Part IV discusses why a clear rule is particularly desirable and impor-
tant in this area, both for practical reasons and for doctrinal consis-
tency with other due process clause jurisprudence. Part V explains
why the concerns expressed by the Nicastro concurrence regarding
modern technology should not be an impediment to choosing between
the two competing approaches to the stream of commerce theory. Fi-
nally, Part VI concludes with the hope that the next time the Supreme
Court confronts this issue, a majority of Justices will choose one of
these approaches to provide a little more clarity for companies, con-
sumers, litigators, and courts.
3. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011).
4. Id. at 2788-89.
5. Id. at 2804.
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II. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S PERSONAL JURISDICTION
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE STREAM OF
COMMERCE THEORY
In the years leading up the Court's 1987 decision in Asahi, two
trends emerged that seemed to be at loggerheads with each other. On
the one hand, the Court consistently required some sort of intent on
the part of the defendant to avail itself of the forum before personal
jurisdiction could be exercised.6 At the same time, the scope of per-
sonal jurisdiction expanded to adapt to the realities of the rapidly ex-
panding national and global marketplace.7 Some lower courts
advocated for a "stream of commerce" test whereby the act of placing
a chattel into the stream of commerce, where it was likely to end up in
a particular forum, was enough to subject a defendant to jurisdiction
in that forum.8 The Court had an opportunity to reconcile these issues
in Asahi but instead produced a fractured opinion, with four Justices
favoring a stricter test of purposeful availment9 and four Justices
favoring adoption of a broad version of the "stream of commerce"
test.10
A. Background
Modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence began with the famous
case of International Shoe v. Washington." There, the defendant, a
Delaware corporation, hired a team of salesmen to sell shoes in Wash-
ington.12 The state of Washington sought to collect certain taxes from
the defendant and the defendant refused, arguing, among other
things, that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington.' 3
The Court used this case to move away from traditional rules of
personal jurisdiction that allowed the assertion of jurisdiction only
6. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985).
7. See Lindy Burris Arwood, Note, Personal Jurisdiction: Are the Federal Rules Keeping Up
with (Internet) Traffic?, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 967, 997-98 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court's
expansion of personal jurisdiction in the second half of the twentieth century in response to the
modem market place and modem technology).
8. See Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory: A Reap-
praisal and a Revised Approach, 77 Ky. L.J. 243, 259 (1989) ("Under this standard, as liberally
interpreted, jurisdiction was upheld not only over manufacturers who intentionally marketed
their products in the forum but over manufacturers who merely knew or should have known that
their products would or could reach the forum." (emphasis in original)).
9. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
10. Id. at 116-18 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
11. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. Id. at 313-14.
13. Id. at 312-14.
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when a defendant was physically present in a forum.14 Instead, the
Court turned the focus to whether a defendant has "certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."" 5
In the context of corporate defendants, the Court noted that whether
the Due Process Clause allows the assertion of personal jurisdiction
"must depend ... upon the quality and nature of the activity [engaged
in by the corporation in the forum] in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure [sic]."16 The Court went on to hold that the exercise
of jurisdiction was proper in that case because the defendant's opera-
tions in Washington had "resulted in a large volume of interstate busi-
ness, in the course of which [the defendant] received the benefits and
protection of the laws of [Washington]," and the current suit "arose
out of those very activities."' 7
In the years since International Shoe, the Court has refined the test
for personal jurisdiction into a single test with two distinct require-
ments. First, the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum to avail itself of the laws of the forum.' 8 For corporate
defendants, these sorts of contacts typically involve things such as hav-
ing offices in the forum, conducting business in the forum, sending
employees to the forum, or advertising in the forum.' 9 Second, even if
minimum contacts are established, the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion must be consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." 20  "[T]he reasonableness of the exercise of
jurisdiction in each case . . . depend[s] on an evaluation of several
factors," including: the burden on the defendant, the interests of the
forum state, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.21 A court
must also consider "the interstate judicial system's interest in ob-
14. Id. at 316.
15. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
16. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
17. Id. at 320.
18. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); see also Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (Contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction are "some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.").
19. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-17 (1984) (ex-
amining a corporation's contacts with a state, including purchasing supplies from the state, send-
ing an executive to the state to negotiate a deal, and sending employees to the state for
trainings); Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (noting the defendant's lack of advertising in the forum,
offices in the forum or business conducted in the forum).
20. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see, e.g.,
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
21. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
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taining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive so-
cial policies." 22
The Supreme Court has also delineated two different types of per-
sonal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.23 Gen-
eral jurisdiction allows a state to hear all claims against a defendant,
whether or not those claims are connected to the defendant's contacts
with the state.24 A showing that general jurisdiction may be asserted
over a foreign corporation requires that the corporation have "affilia-
tions with the State [that] are so 'continuous and systematic' as to
render them essentially at home in the forum State."25 This is a high
bar,26 and the Supreme Court has found the exercise of general juris-
diction appropriate in only a single case in the sixty-five years since
International Shoe was decided. 27 Perhaps, in part, because of the dif-
ficult standard required for general jurisdiction, after "the emergence
of specific jurisdiction in the twentieth century, the exercise of general
jurisdiction has become rare."28
Specific jurisdiction arises when the claim against the defendant is
connected to the defendant's activities within the forum.29 Specific
jurisdiction is triggered when the defendant "purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,"30 which gives rise to
a court's ability to adjudicate "issues deriving from, or connected with,
the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction." 31 It is in these sorts
22. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
23. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851, 2853-54
(2011); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9.
24. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
25. Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
26. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting
that the standard for general jurisdiction "is an exacting standard, as it should be, because a
finding of general jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to
answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world").
27. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952) (upholding Ohio's
exercise of general jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation when the company was essentially
run from Ohio during World War II).
28. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 630 (1988);
see also Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A
Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Contro-
versies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 130 (2012) (opining that Goodyear represented "the final nail
into the coffin of the doctrine of general personal jurisdiction").
29. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854 (collecting cases).
30. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
31. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
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of cases that the controversy over the "stream of commerce" test has
arisen. 32
B. Purposeful Availment
Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v. Denckla,
the Court has required that, in order to be subject to specific jurisdic-
tion, a defendant must engage in "some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State."33 In Hanson, a woman living in Pennsylvania exe-
cuted a deed of trust making a Delaware trust company the trustee of
some of her assets.34 Several years after executing the trust, the
woman moved to Florida where she later died.35 Upon her death, one
of the beneficiaries of her will brought a declaratory judgment action
in Florida seeking to have the trust voided. 36 The beneficiaries of the
trust argued that the Florida court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the Delaware trust company, an indispensible party.37
The Supreme Court held that Florida courts could not exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company.38 The Court
noted that although it may have been relatively easy for the defendant
to respond to this suit, the restrictions placed on jurisdiction by the
Due Process Clause "are more than a guarantee of immunity from
inconvenient or distant litigation." 39 Instead, the Clause requires that
"the defendant purposefully avail[ ] itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." 40 Here, the Court found that the trust
company had virtually no contacts with Florida other than the dece-
dent's decision to move there after creating the trust.41 "The unilat-
eral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State." 42
32. Cf id. at 2855 (noting that the stream of commerce test is relevant to the specific jurisdic-
tion inquiry, not general jurisdiction).
33. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; see, e.g. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76
(1985) (noting the Court's frequent reliance on the purposeful availment requirement from
Hanson).
34. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238.
35. Id. at 239.
36. Id. at 240.
37. Id. at 241-42.
38. Id. at 251.
39. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.
40. Id. at 253.
41. Id. at 251.
42. Id. at 253.
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The Supreme Court continued its focus on the defendant's actions
and intentions in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.43
There, a family bought a car from a dealership in New York and later
drove the car across the country until they got in an automobile acci-
dent in Oklahoma and the car caught on fire, injuring the family."
The family sued the car dealership and the distributor of the car (who
was based in New York and distributed cars in New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut) 45 in a products liability action in Oklahoma state
court.46 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction
was appropriate, despite the lack of contacts between the defendants
and Oklahoma, because a car, "by its very design and purpose" is mo-
bile, so the defendants could foresee that it could end up in
Oklahoma. 47
The Supreme Court rejected this approach and held that the de-
fendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma. 48 The
Court noted that "'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause." 49
The Court argued that because it is foreseeable that all kinds of prod-
ucts could be moved after they are sold, adopting an approach focused
on foreseeability would result in "[e]very seller of chattels[,] . . .in
effect[,] appoint[ing] the chattel his agent for service of process."50
The Court explained, however, that foreseeability did have an im-
portant role in the personal jurisdiction inquiry:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrele-
vant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is
not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the fo-
rum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection
with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there. The Due Process Clause, by ensuring
the "orderly administration of the laws," gives a degree of predict-
ability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to struc-
ture their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.5'
43. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
44. Id. at 288.
45. The plaintiffs also sued the manufacturer of the car, a German corporation, and its im-
porter; however, neither of those parties challenged the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
them by the Oklahoma court. Id. at 288 n.3.
46. Id.
47. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).
48. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291.
49. Id. at 295.
50. Id. at 296.
51. Id. at 297 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
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Thus, the Court held that, since the defendants did not take any action
to avail themselves of Oklahoma's laws that would put them on notice
that they could be subject to suit in Oklahoma, personal jurisdiction
could not be asserted.5 2
C. The Stream of Commerce Theory
At the same time the Court was focusing on the intentions of the
defendant, however, the Court was also expanding the reach of per-
sonal jurisdiction in recognition of evolving commerce and technol-
ogy. The Court explicitly acknowledged this trend in McGee v.
International Life Insurance.53 In McGee, the Court upheld the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by California courts over a non-resident insurance
company when the company had entered into an insurance contract
with a California resident and that contract was the subject of the liti-
gation, even though the company had no other contacts with Califor-
nia.5 4 After describing the recent history of the Court's personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence the Court noted:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly
discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this
is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national
economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions
touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the
full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has
come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail
across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and
communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic
activity.55
The Court's acknowledgement of the influence of technology on com-
merce is even more striking in light of the fact that McGee was de-
cided in 1957.56
Building off of this acknowledgement, the Illinois Supreme Court
first enunciated the stream of commerce test in Gray v. American Ra-
diator & Standard Sanitary Corp.57 In that case, the defendant, an
52. Id.
53. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
54. Id. at 223.
55. Id. at 222-23.
56. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 ("The historical developments noted in Mc-
Gee, of course, have only accelerated in the generation since that case was decided.").
57. Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); see also, e.g.,
Murphy, supra note 8, at 256 (noting that Gray is "the case from which the stream of commerce
theory originated").
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Ohio corporation, sold a safety valve to a company in Pennsylvania,
which incorporated the valve into its water heater, and then sold that
heater to a consumer in Illinois.58 The water heater exploded and in-
jured the consumer, and the consumer brought a product liability ac-
tion against the defendant in Illinois state court.59 The defendant
argued that it had insufficient contacts with Illinois to be subject to
personal jurisdiction there.60
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, holding that it was sufficient
for personal jurisdiction purposes if "the act or transaction itself has a
substantial connection with the State of the forum." 6 1 The court be-
gan its analysis by examining recent Supreme Court cases, including
McGee, as well as recent cases from other states expanding the scope
of personal jurisdiction to account for modern business practices. 62
Then, the court explained the rationale for the stream of commerce
theory:
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the
growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a
manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other States. The
fact that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one, how-
ever, does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of his
business; and it is not unreasonable, where a cause of action arises
from alleged defects in his product, to say that the use of such prod-
ucts in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with
this State to justify a requirement that he defend here.63
Thus, the court held that the defendant could be subject to personal
jurisdiction in Illinois because the defendant could have reasonably
assumed that the water heater containing its valves would be sold in
Illinois.64
Many courts subsequently adopted Gray's approach and focused on
whether or not it was foreseeable that a product put into the stream of
commerce would end up in the place where the injury occurred.65
However, other courts were reluctant to adopt it, or at least to go as
58. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
59. Id. at 762. The defendant apparently had no other contacts with the state of Illinois, but
the court did observe that it was a "reasonable inference" that some of its products (other than
the particular valve at issue) ended up being substantially used and consumed within Illinois.
See id at 764, 766.
60. Id. at 762.
61. Id. at 764.
62. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 764-66.
63. Id. at 766.
64. See id. at 766.
65. Murphy, supra note 8, at 259 nn.77-79.
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far as the court in Gray, because of the Supreme Court's requirement
in Hanson that a defendant purposefully avail itself of the forum.66
The Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen appeared
to clear up some of the confusion by rejecting total reliance on fore-
seeability. 6 7 However, the Court also seemed to implicitly endorse at
least some version of the stream of commerce test:
Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor ... is
not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the mar-
ket for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it
to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise
has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The
forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that de-
livers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State. 68
Without any explanation of what was meant by "expectation" in the
context of the stream of commerce, the Court's opinion in World-
Wide Volkswagen left the fate of the stream of commerce theory
unclear.69
D. Asahi
The Court had an opportunity to clarify things in Asahi Metal In-
dustry Co. v. Superior Court.70 In that case, one of the defendants, a
Japanese corporation (Asahi) that manufactured tire valve assemblies,
sold its products to a tire manufacturer in Taiwan, which sold its tires
in California. 71 One of the tires was involved in a motorcycle accident
in California and the plaintiff sued the Taiwanese manufacturer, which
in turn sued Asahi, seeking indemnification. 72 The Supreme Court of
California upheld jurisdiction over Asahi because, although Asahi had
no contacts with California, it had intentionally placed its products
into the stream of commerce with the awareness that some of the
components would eventually be sold in California.73
66. Id. at 260 (citing Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978) (rejecting jurisdic-
tion in Arkansas over an Italian corporation whose product reached Arkansas through a British
intermediary, in part because there was no showing that the defendant had intentionally availed
itself of Arkansas' laws)).
67. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980); see also
supra Part II.A.2.
68. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (emphasis added).
69. See Murphy, supra note 8, at 270.
70. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
71. Id. at 106.
72. Id.
73. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 550 (Cal. 1985).
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The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.74 An eight Justice ma-
jority,75 in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, held that, whether or not
Asahi had sufficient minimum contacts with California to satisfy the
first prong of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, exercising jurisdiction
in this context would not be consistent with "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" as required by the second prong. 76 The
Court noted that while it would be very inconvenient for Asahi to
defend itself in California, the state of California and the plaintiff (the
Taiwanese company) had only a "slight" interest in adjudicating the
suit in California.77 The Justices' agreement, however, ended there.
In a portion of her opinion joined by three other Justices,78 Justice
O'Connor rejected the expansive version of the stream of commerce
theory exemplified by the California Supreme Court's decision.79 She
stressed that the minimum contacts that give rise to personal jurisdic-
tion "must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully di-
rected toward the forum State."s0 Given that principle, this group of
Justices would have held that "a defendant's awareness that the
stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum
State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State."81
Instead, a defendant must exhibit "[a]dditional conduct" to indicate
an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state, such as
advertising in the forum or designing a product for the market in that
forum.82 Since Asahi had exhibited no such additional conduct, Jus-
tice O'Connor would have found its contacts with California insuffi-
cient to satisfy due process.83
Justice Brennan, in an opinion also joined by three other Justices, 84
sharply disagreed with Justice O'Connor's approach.85 This group of
Justices argued that, because "[t]he stream of commerce refers not to
unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated
flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale," a
lawsuit in a forum where a final product was being marketed "cannot
74. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108.
75. Justice Scalia did not join this portion of the opinion.
76. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
77. Id. at 116.
78. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia.
79. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
80. Id. (emphasis in original).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 112.
83. Id. at 112-13.
84. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun.
85. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-18 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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come as a surprise" to a defendant manufacturer of component parts
like Asahi.86 Justice Brennan noted, echoing the court in Gray, that a
manufacturer who places its product into the stream of commerce in
this manner "indirectly benefits from the [forum] State's laws that reg-
ulate and facilitate commercial activity."87 Thus, he concluded that
because Asahi was aware of the distribution system that carried its
valves into California and knew that that distribution system would
benefit it economically, sufficient minimum contacts had been estab-
lished for California to assert jurisdiction over Asahi under the first
prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry.88
Justice Stevens, although he said he was "inclined" to agree with
Justice Brennan's conclusion, did not join either opinion because the
determination of the minimum contacts issue was unnecessary to the
decision in the case in light of the majority's conclusion that asserting
jurisdiction here was not in accord with traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. 89
Thus, Asahi did not reconcile the stream of commerce test with the
purposeful availment requirement. Following Asahi, lower courts
were left to choose for themselves whether to follow Justice Brennan's
approach, Justice O'Connor's approach, or some combination of the
two. Unsurprisingly, this created a split in authority, with a fairly even
number of courts applying each approach and several courts trying to
apply both approaches.90
III. NiCASTRO
After Asahi, it would be another twenty-four years before the Court
revisited the stream of commerce test.91 Finally, the Court took an
86. Id. at 117.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 121.
89. See id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' opinion was also joined by Justices
White and Blackmun.
90. See Dustin Buebler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 105, 115-16 &
nn.60-62 (2012) (collecting cases applying each approach and avoiding the question). Some
courts and commentators refer to Justice O'Connor's approach as the "stream of commerce-
plus" approach and refer to Justice Brennan's approach simply as the "stream of commerce"
theory. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publ'g, 327 F.3d 472, 479-80 (6th
Cir. 2003) (adopting the "stream of commerce plus" approach and noting the varying ap-
proaches other courts have taken).
91. In fact, the Court barely addressed personal jurisdiction issues at all during this period,
with the exception being Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), in which a divided
Court affirmed the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant who had insufficient minimum
contacts with the state under International Shoe but was physically present in the state when he
was serv6d with process.
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opportunity to address this issue in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro.92
The facts of Nicastro are fairly straightforward. The plaintiff was
injured while using a metal recycling machine at his workplace in New
Jersey.93 The manufacturer of the machine was a company incorpo-
rated in the United Kingdom.94 That company sold the machine at
issue to its distributor in the United States, based in Ohio, which then
sold the machine to the plaintiff's New Jersey employer.95 Although
the manufacturer had no direct contacts with New Jersey, its president
had attended several trade shows in Nevada to promote the machine,
one of which was attended by a representative from the plaintiff's em-
ployer.96 The plaintiff sued both the distributor 97 and the manufac-
turer in New Jersey state court, but the manufacturer argued that it
was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.98
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey courts could
exercise jurisdiction over the manufacturer. 99 First, the court noted
that the manufacturer did not have any contacts with New Jersey that
would otherwise justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction, so the
exercise of jurisdiction over the manufacturer "must sink or swim with
the stream-of-commerce theory of jurisdiction."100 Next, the court
surveyed the history of the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction ju-
risprudence, as well as its own, and noted "[t]he expanding reach of a
state court's jurisdiction, as permitted by due process, has reflected ...
historical developments" in the nature of the economy and technol-
ogy.101 Against this backdrop, the court reaffirmed earlier New Jersey
law following Justice Brennan's Asahi opinion: "[a] foreign manufac-
turer will be subject to this State's jurisdiction if it knows or reasona-
92. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2783 (2011).
93. Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 578.
96. Id. at 579.
97. The distributor apparently filed for bankruptcy before the events giving rise to the lawsuit
occurred and, as of the date of the Supreme Court's opinion, "ha[d] not participated in th[e]
lawsuit." See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2796 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The fact that the distrib-
utor was bankrupt, leaving the plaintiff potentially without anyone to seek recovery from in New
Jersey, or even anywhere in the United States, was an issue of concern to some Justices at oral
argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12:11-13:1, Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (No. 09-
1343).
98. See Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 578.
99. Id. at 577.
100. Id. at 582.
101. Id. at 582.
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bly should know that through its distribution scheme its products are
being sold in New Jersey." 102
Under that rule, the court found that if "[a] manufacturer that
knows or reasonably should know that its products are distributed
through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those
products being sold in any of the fifty states must expect that it will be
subject to this State's jurisdiction if one of its defective products is
sold to a New Jersey consumer." 103 Thus, the court concluded that J.
McIntyre knew or reasonably should have known that its distribution
system might lead to its products entering New Jersey because repre-
sentatives from the national distributor and the manufacturer at-
tended trade shows in various cities around the country (albeit not in
New Jersey). 104 The court reasoned that it was clear that those attend-
ing the trade shows came from areas other than the cities hosting
those events, meaning that while "J. McIntyre may not have known
the precise destination of [each of its products,] it clearly knew or
should have known that the products were intended for sale and dis-
tribution to customers located anywhere in the United States."105
Therefore, the court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant was permissible.
In a spirited dissenting opinion, Justice Hoens sharply criticized the
majority for misconstruing both of the Asahi plurality opinions and
prior New Jersey law to effectively render "any effort by a manufac-
turer to sell its product anywhere in the nation as the only act needed
for assertion of . . . jurisdiction."10 6 Justice Hoens argued that the
majority's analysis impermissibly moved the focus away from the ac-
tions of the defendant and towards a balancing of the burden on the
defendant and the benefit to the plaintiff of litigating in New Jersey.107
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Rivera-Soto presciently urged
the United States Supreme Court to review the case.108
102. Id. at 591-92.
103. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 592.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 593.
106. Id. at 594 (Hoens, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 603-04.
108. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 605 (Soto, J., dissenting) ("Because the majority 'has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with' settled federal constitutional principles,
creates a new, insubstantial, and meaningless standard for the unbounded exercise of long-arm
jurisdiction, and disturbs the careful balance that limits the exercise of judicial power between
and among the several states, this decision is ripe for review and correction by the Supreme
Court of the United States." (citation omitted)).
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A. The Court's Opinions
In a six to three decision, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed. 109 However, despite a quarter century and the addition of
eight new Justices since Asahi, the Court again produced no majority
opinion and ended up with a plurality and dissent echoing many of the
same themes Justices O'Connor and Brennan argued over in Asahi so
many years earlier.
In an opinion for a plurality of four Justices,110 Justice Kennedy
staked out a strong defense of Justice O'Connor's position in Asahi."n
Justice Kennedy noted that "[t]he stream of commerce, like other
metaphors, has its deficiencies as well as its utility."11 2 Justice Ken-
nedy's focus, like Justice O'Connor's, was on the defendant's specific
intent. Thus, while a defendant may subject itself to the jurisdiction of
a state by introducing products into the stream of commerce in an
effort to "seek to serve" a given state's market, it cannot be subject to
jurisdiction without some action that "manifest[s] an intention to sub-
mit to the power of" the state at issue.113 "[A]s a general rule, it is not
enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will
reach the forum State." 4
The plurality explicitly rejected Justice Brennan's approach. In the
plurality's view, Justice Brennan's approach impermissibly "discarded
the central concept of sovereign authority in favor of considerations of
fairness and foreseeability."115 The plurality noted that, although per-
sonal jurisdiction doctrine protects individual liberty, it does so by
preserving the individual's right to be subject only to lawful power,
and the exercise of lawful.power is dependent on whether the sover-
eign has the authority to render a judgment in a given case.116 There-
fore, instead of fairness, the primary concern of the personal
jurisdiction inquiry should be whether the defendant has consented to
109. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (plurality opinion).
110. Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas.
111. But see Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
1551, 1563 (2012) ("Whether Justice Kennedy's opinion is more stringent than Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi is unclear. The fact that Justice Kennedy requires target-
ing the forum could lead to different results when the manufacturer advertises in regional or
national media. Justice O'Connor might find such advertising sufficient to show that the manu-
facturer had 'an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State,' while Justice Kennedy
might find such advertising insufficiently targeted to give rise to jurisdiction.").
112. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
113. Id. (citations omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 27889.
116. Id. at 2789.
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the exercise of jurisdiction by "follow[ing] a course of conduct di-
rected at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a
given sovereign."" 7
Under this analysis, the result required in this case was obvious: J.
McIntyre could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey
courts. The plurality conceded that the defendant had directed mar-
keting and sales efforts at the United States as a whole. 18 In the plu-
rality's view, however, this fact was irrelevant since the case involved a
New Jersey state court attempting to exercise jurisdiction; thus, it was
the defendant's "purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with the
United States, that alone [were] relevant." 119 Therefore, the fact that
the defendant had engaged a distributor to sell its products into the
United States did not reveal an intent to serve the New Jersey market
in particular because the defendant had taken no action to target the
New Jersey market, such as advertising in New Jersey or directing its
distributor to sell to specific New Jersey customers.120
In a dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, Justice Gins-
burg sharply disagreed.121 In the dissent's view, the plurality's ap-
proach "turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm
statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court ... need
only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent
distributors market it."122 The dissent rejected the plurality's distinc-
tion between directing products to the United States as a whole and
directing products to a particular state. 123 According to Justice Gins-
burg, J. McIntyre's arrangement with its U.S. distributor was "illustra-
tive of marketing arrangements for sales in the United States common
in today's commercial world. A foreign-country manufacturer en-
gages a U.S. company to promote and distribute the manufacturer's
products, not in any particular State, but anywhere and everywhere in
the United States the distributor can attract purchasers."124
While declining to specifically side with Justice Brennan's Asahi
opinion over Justice O'Connor's,125 the dissent did mount a strong de-
117. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789.
118. Id. at 2790.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
122. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2795 (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal
Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 555 (1995)) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2797, 2799.
124. Id. at 2799.
125. See id. at 2803 (noting that in light of the Court's agreement in Asahi that subjecting the
defendant to jurisdiction did not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, "the dueling opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor were hardly necessary");
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fense of notions of fairness and convenience factoring into personal
jurisdiction analysis:
The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations and other
legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave prime place to
reason and fairness. Is it not fair and reasonable, given the mode of
trading of which this case is an example, to require the international
seller to defend at the place its products cause injury? Do not litiga-
tional convenience and choice-of-law considerations point in that
direction? On what measure of reason and fairness can it be consid-
ered undue to require McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey as an
incident of its efforts to develop a market for its industrial machines
anywhere and everywhere in the United States? Is not the burden
on McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e., a reasonable cost
of transacting business internationally, in comparison to the burden
on Nicastro to go to Nottingham, England to gain recompense for
an injury he sustained using McIntyre's product at his workplace in
Saddle Brook, New Jersey?126
Although the dissent would still take into account the defendant's
intent, it would do so in a much more general way than the plurality.
In the dissent's view, the purposeful availment requirement "simply
'ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as
a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts." 127 It does not
prevent the assertion of jurisdiction where a manufacturer, like J. Mc-
Intyre, hires a distributor knowing it is likely that the distributor will
sell its products in a particular forum.128
The dissent suggested a possible distinction between cases involving
local plaintiffs injured by the activity of a defendant seeking to exploit
a multi-state or global market and cases involving defendants whose
economic activities are "largely home-based" and who do not have
"designs to gain substantial revenue from sales in distant markets." 129
In the latter case, the dissent found that the place where the product
at issue caused the injury seems to usually be the most appropriate
place for a suit.' 3 0 From this framework, the dissent would have
see also id. (finding Asahi distinguishable because it did not involve a California plaintiff and
Asahi was a component parts manufacturer who had "little control over the final destination of
its products" (citations and quotations omitted)).
126. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2800-01.
127. Id. at 2801 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
128. See id. at 2801 ("How could McIntyre UK not have intended, by its actions targeting a
national market, to sell products in the fourth largest destination for imports among all States of
the United States and the largest scrap metal market?").
129. Id. at 2804.
130. Id.
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found that J. McIntyre could be subject to personal jurisdiction in
New Jersey.'13
In a concurrence joined by Justice Alito, Justice Breyer expressly
declined to endorse either the plurality or the dissent's approach. 132
He began by noting that the Supreme Court of New Jersey's opinion
had adopted a "broad understanding of the scope of personal jurisdic-
tion based on its view" of increasing globalization and recent changes
in communication technology. 133 However, in Justice Breyer's view,
this case did not present any of the issues raised by modern technol-
ogy and commerce, thus making it an inappropriate vehicle to
"mak[e] broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional
rules." 134
According to the concurrence, this case could be decided on the
narrow grounds that the defendant had sold only a single machine in
New Jersey.'35 Justice Breyer argued that, in Asahi, all the Justices of
the Court agreed that a single sale of a product in a state cannot form
an adequate basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant, even if the defendant places its goods in the stream of
commerce "fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take
place." 136 Such an isolated sale, in the concurrence's view, was not
enough to show the "'regular . . . flow' or 'regular course' of sales in
New Jersey" required for the assertion of jurisdiction under any for-
mulation of the stream of commerce test. 3 7
The concurrence argued that both the plurality and the dissent's ap-
proach would present unanticipated and potentially negative conse-
quences if applied to situations raised by modern commerce. Justice
Breyer took the plurality to task for stating what he implicitly sug-
131. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2804. Justice Ginsburg also noted that she took "heart that the
plurality opinion does not speak for the Court, for that opinion would take a giant step away
from the 'notions of fair play and substantial justice' underling International Shoe." Id.
132. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791, 2792-93 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
133. Id. at 2791.
134. Id. at 2791.
135. See id. at 2791-92.
136. Id. at 2792 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 111-12 (1987)
(opinion of O'Connor, J.) (requiring "something more" than simply placing "a product into the
stream of commerce," even if defendant is "awar[e]" that the stream "may or will sweep the
product into the forum State"); id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (jurisdiction should lie where a sale in a State is part of "the regular and anticipated
flow" of commerce into the State, but not where that sale is only an "edd[y]," i.e., an isolated
occurrence); id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (indicating
that "the volume, the value, and the hazardous character" of a good may affect the jurisdictional
inquiry and emphasizing Asahi's "regular course of dealing")).
137. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
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gested was an overly strict rule limiting jurisdiction to situations in
which the defendant specifically intends to submit to the power of the
sovereign at issue:
But what do those standards mean when a company targets the
world by selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if,
instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the
products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then re-
ceives and fulfills the orders? And what if the company markets its
products through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed
in a forum? Those issues have serious commercial consequences
but are totally absent in this case.138
However, Justice Breyer went on to note that he did not agree with
the "absolute approach adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court"
that in his view focused only on whether the defendant knew, or rea-
sonably should have known, that its distribution system might lead to
the defendant's products being sold in the forum at issue.139 Such an
approach, the concurrence warned, could have seemingly unfair
consequences:
What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which
specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its
product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small
manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his product
(cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a
single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii).
I know too little about the range of these or in-between possibilities
to abandon in favor of the more absolute rule what has previously
been this Court's less absolute approach.
Further, the fact that the defendant is a foreign, rather than a
domestic, manufacturer makes the basic fairness of an absolute rule
yet more uncertain. . . . [M]anufacturers come in many shapes and
sizes. It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small Egyptian
shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan
coffee farmer, selling its products through international distributors,
to respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in
the United States, even those in respect to which the foreign firm
has no connection at all but the sale of a single (allegedly defective)
good.140
Thus, Justice Breyer declined to pick between the plurality and the
dissent but implied that he might be more willing to "work such a
change to the law" in a case that implicated the "relevant contempo-
rary commercial circumstances."141 Because, in his view, this case did
138. Id. at 2793.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2793-94.
141. Id. at 2794.
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not implicate those issues and could be easily resolved by the fact that
the defendant only sold a single product into New Jersey, Justice
Breyer concurred only in the judgment.
B. The Confusion Created by the Opinions
The lack of a majority rationale in Nicastro, just like in Asahi so
many years before, has generated some controversy and perhaps pro-
vided the framework for defense arguments against jurisdiction in
some stream of commerce cases, but it has failed to provide courts and
companies with clear guidance. Although split decisions of the Court
can occasionally provide useful guidance for lower courts and the pub-
lic, this is particularly unlikely here because of the extremely narrow
grounds on which the controlling concurrence was based. Indeed, as
one court put it, "[1]ike one of Dr. Rorschach's amorphous ink blots,
Justice Breyer's opinion is susceptible to multiple interpretations." 1 4 2
Bearing this out, courts and commentators have been unable to come
to any agreement on the meaning of Nicastro, other than perhaps
some consensus that no significant guidance can be gleaned from it.
1. Public and Scholarly Reaction
The Court's split decision in Nicastro, after its long silence on per-
sonal jurisdiction issues, also predictably generated quite a bit of com-
mentary. Some commentators, particularly those sympathetic to the
defense side of the civil litigation bar, were quick to declare an end to
the foreseeability analysis put forward by Justice Brennan in Asahi.143
Similarly, many observers more sympathetic to the plaintiffs' side of
the equation were quick to sound the alarm that Nicastro marked the
beginning of an age in which foreign corporations can easily insulate
142. State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co., 403 S.W. 3d 726, 759 (Tenn. 2013).
143. See, e.g., Kim M. Watterson & Paige H. Forster, Supreme Court Rejects Expansive
'Stream of Commerce' Theory on Personal Jurisdiction, REED SMrrH (June 29, 2011), http://www.
reedsmith.com/supreme-court-rejects-expansive-stream-of-commerce-theory-of-personal-juris
diction-06-29-20111/ ("McIntyre . .. provide[s] solid footing on which a defendant can fight juris-
diction in any state where it has not 'purposefully availed' itself of the privilege of conducting
activities, even if its products make their way to that forum. Under McIntyre, courts going for-
ward will look at the defendant's conduct in targeting the forum state, rather than the foresee-
ability that the defendant would be sued there. The decision adds a welcome level of clarity and
concreteness to the personal jurisdiction inquiry."); Jim Beck, Personal Jurisdiction 2.0, DRUG
AND DEVICE L. (Jul. 14, 2011), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2011/07/personal-jurisdic
tion-20.html ("[I]t seems pretty clear that [Justices Breyer and Alito] are two more votes [in
addition to the plurality] against the dissent's - and the Brennan Asahi concurrence's - reliance
on pure foreseeability as sufficient for stream of commerce personal jurisdiction. That issue
seems dead.").
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themselves from suit in the United States.144 However, most initial
reactions and analyses focused on the continuing uncertainty from
Asahi.145
Scholarly reaction has been similarly varied. On one side, law re-
view pieces have interpreted Nicastro to be the harbinger of a new era
of virtual immunity from suit for foreign defendants in the United
States. 146 Other scholars have suggested that the combination of the
dissent and the concurrence signals the Court's willingness "to once
again adjust its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to more effectively
contend with the modern economy." 147 Still, most reactions-includ-
ing this Article-lament the lack of guidance provided by Nicastro's
split decision after so many years of silence from the Court.148
144. See, e.g., Press Release, SCOTUS Ruling in McIntyre v. Nicastro Adds Obstacles to
Holding Foreign Corporations Accountable in the U.S., Am. Ass'n for Justice (June 27, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl16166.htm ("The U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro today makes it more difficult to hold foreign
manufacturers accountable in the U.S. court system."); Maxwell Kennerly, Supreme Court Term
In Review For Consumers, Employees and Injured Persons, LrnIG. & TRIAL (July 5, 2011), http://
www.litigationandtrial.com/2011/07/articles/attorney/personal-injury-1/supreme-court-term-in-
review-for-consumers-employees-and-injured-persons/ ("[Nicastro] makes it harder [to] hold
foreign companies accountable for dangerous products, since the foreign companies typically
conduct their activities through distributors.").
145. See, e.g., Buehler, supra note 90, at 120 (noting that, after Nicastro, "the stream of com-
merce doctrine will be very much in flux in the years ahead"); Howard Wasserman, Clarifying
personal jurisdiction ... or not, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 28, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2011/06/clarifying-personal-jurisdiction-or-not.html ("As we all remember from 1L,
the Asahi Court divided 4-4-1 .... Twenty-five years later, still no resolution. Four justices, lead
by Justice Kennedy, emphatically rejected the Brennan view. . . . But we still do not have a
majority view on the question. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Alito,
to again punt the question."); Kendall Gray, J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro: Declarifying
Asahi, THE App. REC. (June 28, 2011), http://www.appellaterecord.com/2011/06/articles/new-
opinions/j-mcintyre-machinery-v-nicastro-declarifying-asahil ("Nicastro gave the Court a chance
to pick [between the competing approaches in Asahi]. But alas, five cats could not be herded
into a single corral. . . . For want of a fifth vote, we are about 14,000 words the richer after
today's three opinions, but none the wiser.").
146. See Kristianna L. Sciarra, Note, A Gap in Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning: An Analysis
of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 31 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 195, 195 (2013) ("Following
the Supreme Court's recent decision in J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, a foreign corpo-
ration can now deliberately target the United States market and sell products anywhere in the
country but escape personal jurisdiction in a state where one of its products injures a customer as
long as the corporation did not 'purposefully avail' itself of the market in that particular state.").
147. See Johnjerica Hodge, Minimum Contacts in the Global Economy: A Critical Guide to J.
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 64 ALA. L. REV. 417, 419 (2012).
148. See, e.g., Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroll, Refining The Due-Process Contours
of General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 11 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 49, 49 (2012) (describ-
ing Nicastro as a "missed . . . opportunity to provide needed guidance to state and federal courts
tasked with determining the level of business contacts that may subject a foreign corporation to a
forum's general personal jurisdiction"); Simpson-Wood, supra note 28, at 124 n.74.
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2. The Marks Test
Under the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Marks v. United
States,'149 the way to divine a binding rule from a decision with no ma-
jority opinion, such as Nicastro, is to look for the "position taken by
those Members [of the Court] who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."150 However, the Court, on at least two occasions,
has questioned the workability of this rule, noting that it "is more eas-
ily stated than applied," and declined to "pursue the Marks inquiry to
the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and di-
vided the lower courts that have considered it."'st
Even if the Marks test remains viable, it is not particularly helpful in
this case. It does seem clear that the members of the Court who con-
curred in the judgment on the narrowest ground appear to be Justices
Breyer and Alito. However, their concurrence explicitly disclaims the
creation of any "new" personal jurisdiction rules, noting that "resolv-
ing this case requires no more than adhering to our precedents"
which, in the concurrence's view, have never allowed "a single iso-
lated sale" in a forum to form the basis for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction.15 2 Therefore, at most, Nicastro stands for the proposition
that a single sale from a national distributor to a particular state does
not subject the manufacturer to personal jurisdiction in that state.
However, this proposition is of limited value to manufacturers seeking
to plan for or avoid liability in particular jurisdictions. 53
A manufacturer cannot be expected to tell its distributor to make
only a single sale of a particular product in a jurisdiction. In fact, such
an instruction might even constitute the type of particularized target-
ing of a sovereign required by the plurality, ensnaring the manufac-
turer in the jurisdiction it was attempting to avoid. Also, while this
"rule of one" makes some sense in the context of the $24,900 machine
at issue in Nicastro, it starts to lose coherence when applied to other
149. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
150. Id. at 193 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
151. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511
U. S. 738, 745-46 (1994) (quotations omitted)); see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (lamenting that even with the Marks test, when the Su-
preme Court fails to reach a majority opinion, "[f]ower courts [must] feel their way on a case-by-
case basis").
152. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
153. See Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 2011 WL 4443626, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2011)
("As Justice Breyer declined to choose between the Asahi plurality opinions, McIntyre is rather
limited in its applicability. It does not provide the Court with grounds to depart from the Fifth
Circuit precedents establishing Justice Brennan's Asahi opinion as the controlling analysis. At
best, it is applicable to cases presenting the same factual scenario that it does.").
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types of goods.154 A company selling prescription drugs to a national
distributor cannot practically limit itself to one sale in any jurisdiction
even if it does not target any particular jurisdiction. Alternatively, a
company selling private jets may adhere to this limit and be subject to
personal jurisdiction anyway because of the large amount of pur-
poseful contacts that would probably be required to make even one
such sale. Thus, the Marks test is unlikely to provide much relief from
Nicastro's opacity.
3. Court Reaction
Unsurprisingly, courts have not found Nicastro particularly helpful
in settling jurisdictional disputes over the stream of commerce doc-
trine. Despite the hopes of critics and fears of supporters of a broad
stream of commerce test, courts have mostly found Justice Breyer's
opinion controlling-and mostly found that it does not have much to
say. Two circuit courts that have taken an in-depth look at Nicastro
have reached the conclusion that, given the narrowness of Justice
Breyer's opinion, the end result of Nicastro is that "the law remains
the same" as it was before, "including the conflicting articulations of
[the stream of commerce] theory in Asahi."55 Similarly, state courts
have largely declined to alter their pre-existing jurisdictional frame-
work based on Nicastro, even when those frameworks would seem to
conflict with the plurality's approach.156
For example, the Fifth Circuit-which had previously adopted a test
similar to Justice Brennan's Asahi approach for stream of commerce
cases-dealt with the impact of Nicastro very directly in a case bearing
154. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("A $24,900 shearing ma-
chine . . . is unlikely to sell in bulk worldwide, much less in any given State.... Had a manufac-
turer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices,
the Court would presumably find the defendant amenable to suit in that State." (internal cita-
tions omitted)).
155. Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng'g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2013); see AFTG-TG,
L.L.C. v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
156. See, e.g., Russell v. SNFA, 987 N.E.2d 778, 794 (Ill. 2013) ("McIntyre has not definitively
clarified the proper application of the stream-of-commerce theory."); Tennessee v. NV Sumatra
Tobacco Trading Co., 403 S.W.3d 726, 756-57 (Tenn. 2013) ("Most courts that have applied the
Marks rule to J. McIntyre Machinery have determined that Justice Breyer's opinion was the
judgment that concurred 'on the narrowest grounds.'. . . Nevertheless, while Justice Breyer's
opinion may be controlling, it fails to resolve the United States Supreme Court's impasse over
the stream of commerce theory and, therefore, leaves existing law undisturbed."); Willemsen v.
Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 875 (Or. 2012) ("If [the Nicastro plurality] opinion were control-
ling, it might be difficult for plaintiff to show that, on this record, CTE's contacts with Oregon
were sufficient to establish jurisdiction over it. As explained above, however, the rule that the
Court announced in Marks for construing splintered decisions leads us to conclude that the ra-
tionale expressed in Justice Breyer's opinion concurring in the judgment controls our resolution
of this case.").
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striking similarities to Nicastro: Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering.57
In that case, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a products liability claim
against an Irish company that hired an Ohio based distributor to dis-
tribute its forklifts.158 The plaintiff's husband was killed by an alleg-
edly defective forklift while working at his job in Mississippi.159 The
plaintiff sued both the distributor and the manufacturer in federal
court in Mississippi, and the district court denied the manufacturer's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.16 0 Like the manu-
facturer in Nicastro, the manufacturer in Ainsworth did not specifi-
cally direct any of its products to Mississippi but, rather, hired its
distributor to distribute its products in the United States generally.' 6'
The manufacturer did nothing to limit the scope of the distributor's
sales of its products by state.162
The Fifth Circuit explicitly acknowledged that its stream of com-
merce test163 is "in tension with the plurality opinion" in Nicastro but
declined to change that test in light of Nicastro.164 Instead, the court
found that the plurality was "not binding precedent" and applied the
Marks test to determine that Justice Breyer's opinion was the control-
ling opinion in Nicastro.165 Echoing the Federal Circuit's similar con-
clusion, the court held that Justice Breyer's concurrence did not
require the abandonment of the Brennan-like approach the Fifth Cir-
cuit had previously adopted.166 The court found that all Justice
Breyer's opinion stood for was that a "single isolated sale" could not
support jurisdiction.167 In this case, since the manufacturer had sold
203 forklifts worth nearly $4 million in Mississippi, the court found the
157. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 174.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 179.
162. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 179.
163. Id. That test allows the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
when a court "'finds that the defendant delivered the product into the stream of commerce with
the expectation that it would be purchased by or used by consumers in the forum state."' Id. at
177 (quoting Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987)). "Under that
test, 'mere foreseeability or awareness [is] a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal jurisdic-
tion if the defendant's product made its way into the forum state while still in the stream of
commerce,' but '[t]he defendant's contacts must be more than random, fortuitous, or attenuated,
or of the unilateral activity of another party or third person."' Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
164. Id. at 178.
165. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 178.
166. Id. at 179 (citing AFTG-TG, L.L.C. v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)).
167. Id. at 178.
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exercise of jurisdiction compatible with Justice Breyer's opinion and
affirmed the district court. 68
The Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Russell
v. SNFA.169 Although the court acknowledged the "isolated sale" rule
from the Nicastro concurrence, it rejected the defendant's argument
that Justice Breyer also endorsed Justice O'Connor's Asahi ap-
proach.170 Accordingly, as it had done in the past, the court declined
to adopt either the broad or the narrow theory of the stream of com-
merce doctrine articulated in the dueling opinions in Asahi and
Nicastro.171
Other courts have purported to glean slightly more from Nicastro.
In Bombardier v. Dow Chemical, the California Court of Appeals
concluded that the plurality and concurrence agreed that "mere fore-
seeability, at least where products are not sold in a state as part of the
regular and anticipated flow of commerce into that state, is not
enough to establish minimum contacts with the forum state."172 How-
ever, the court found that beyond this conclusion (which, arguably
was evident before Nicastro anyway),173 the opinions in Nicastro did
"not significantly add to the state of personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence."174 Other courts have similarly concluded that a test based on
foreseeability alone is ruled out by Nicastro.s75
168. Id. at 179.
169. Russell v. SNFA, 987 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. 2013).
170. Id. at 794 ("Justice Breyer quite clearly disagreed with the plurality's decision to rely on
'strict rules' to limit jurisdiction to only situations when the defendant intended to submit to a
state's sovereign power.").
171. Id. The court concluded in that particular case that it need not decide between the com-
peting approaches because the defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois
under either one because the defendant had taken specific steps to target Illinois as a market for
its products.
172. Bombardier v. Dow Chem. Can. ULC, 216 Cal. App. 4th 591, 598 (Cal. App. 3d Dist.
2013).
173. Indeed, Justice Brennan's Asahi opinion itself endorses the "regular flow" concept. See
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) ("The stream of commerce
refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products
from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.") (Brennan, J. concurring).
174. Bombardier, 216 Cal. App. 4th at 598.
175. See, e.g., Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (D. Md. 2011) ("McIn-
tyre clearly rejects foreseeability as the standard for personal jurisdiction."). At least one court
also found that Nicastro stood for the proposition that targeting a national market was insuffi-
cient to give rise to specific jurisdiction in any one state. See Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing
Sys., L.L.C, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 513 (D.N.J. 2011) ("[Wlhether or not the plurality's strict rule is
the de-facto standard for stream-of-commerce cases going forward, there is no doubt that Nicas-
tro stands for the proposition that targeting the national market is not enough to impute jurisdic-
tion to all the forum States." (emphasis in the original)).
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A few outlier courts have gone further. For example, in Smith v.
Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.,176 the court determined that the
"common denominator of the Court's reasoning and a position ap-
proved by at least five Justices who support the judgment is the
'stream of commerce plus' rubric enunciated in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor in Asahi."'7 7 The court pointed to Justice Breyer's approv-
ing citation of Justice O'Connor's Asahi opinion in his analysis as
proof that "six Justices agree[d] that, at a minimum, the limitations of
Justice O'Connor's test should be applied."178 Similarly, in Northern
Insurance Co. of New York v. Construction Navale Bordeaux,179 the
court cited Justice Breyer's opinion to justify applying Justice
O'Connor's Asahi test to a motion to dismiss by a foreign
defendant. 80
However, cases applying this interpretation are not widespread and
with good reason. 8" It is hard to justify reading Justice Breyer's opin-
ion as changing the status quo when he explicitly disclaimed doing so
in his own opinion. He flatly stated that Nicastro presented "an un-
suitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion ba-
sic jurisdictional rules" and that resolving the case simply required
"adher[ing] strictly to [the Court's] precedents."1 82 Although Justice
Breyer does cite Justice O'Connor's "something more" rule from
Asahi, in that very same string citation, he also cites Justice Brennan's
distinction between the regular and anticipated flow of commerce and
the occasional "eddy."18 3 Justice Breyer was merely using these cita-
tions to support his argument that a "single isolated sale" cannot give
rise to jurisdiction under either of the tests articulated by Asahi, not to
endorse one test over another.184
176. Smith v. Teledyne Cont'1 Motors, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D.S.C. 2012).
177. Id. at 929 (internal quotations omitted).
178. Id. at 931.
179. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Constr. Navale Bordeaux, No. 11-60462-CV, 2011 WL
2682950, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2011).
180. Id. at *5.
181. See Buehler, supra note 90, at 120 ("[I]t would be a mistake for lower courts and scholars
to overreact to the Nicastro Court's limited holding. Justice Breyer did not reject the plurality's
rule or the New Jersey Supreme Court's approach out of hand ... . For now, the law remains
unsettled.").
182. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
183. Id. at 2792. He also cited Justice Stevens' opinion for the proposition that "'the volume,
the value, and the hazardous character' of a good may affect the jurisdictional inquiry[.]" Id.
(quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 121 (1987) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in judgment)).
184. This is a somewhat dubious argument with respect to Justice Brennan's approach. Al-
though Justice Brennan does distinguish between the usual flow and the eddies, that distinction
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Thus, except perhaps in situations involving a single sale, Nicastro
leaves courts without guidance about the proper application of the
stream of commerce doctrine, particularly in the context of foreign
manufacturers. While the Nicastro plurality provides a lot of ammuni-
tion for arguments against assertions of personal jurisdiction, Nicastro
does not lay out a clear rule that will be of much help to foreign manu-
facturers in structuring their conduct to avoid-or account for-po-
tential liability in particular jurisdictions. Instead, the decision in
Nicastro leaves foreign manufacturers, distributors, and consumers-
not to mention litigation attorneys-to "feel their way on a case-by-
case basis" 85 without definitive guidance from the Court. 86
IV. PREDICTABILITY IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION IS CRITICAL
This state of affairs is unacceptable, both from an economic and
legal standpoint. International manufacturers seeking entry into the
American market and the domestic distributors who sell their prod-
ucts have no way to apportion the risk of liability among themselves
or to plan to avoid liability in certain jurisdictions altogether. This
may make foreign manufacturers likely to raise prices to account for
this uncertainty or hesitate to enter the American market
altogether. 87
had much more to do with whether the movement of the defendant's products could have been
anticipated by the defendant, rather than what the volume of those products' happened to be.
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The stream of commerce refers not to
unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manu-
facture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final
product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise.") (emphasis added). It is hard to argue that J. McIntyre could not have anticipated that
one of its machines could end up in New Jersey. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
185. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
186. Since Nicastro was decided, the Court decided two more personal jurisdiction cases-a
relative flood compared to the previous two decades. See Walden v. Fiore, No. 12-574 (U.S. Feb.
25, 2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). However, neither of those cases shed
any new light on the stream of commerce test. In Walden, a unanimous Court rejected the
assertion of personal jurisdiction by a Nevada federal district court over a Georgia police officer
who allegedly filed a false affidavit against a Nevada couple he encountered at a Georgia airport.
Walden, No. 12-574, slip op. at 1-3, 8-9. In Bauman, the Court found that a corporation could
not be subject to general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its subsidiary where that subsidiary
was not incorporated in the forum and did not have its principal place of business there.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62. Notably, in neither Walden nor Bauman did the Court cite the
Nicastro plurality opinion in its recitation of the history of its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,
further suggesting the limited precedential value of that opinion.
187. See Brief of the Org. for Int'l Inv. & Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfr., Inc. as Amici Curiae In
Support of Petitioner at 10, Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343) (noting that several
studies have concluded that unpredictability in the US legal market is one of the top concerns of
businesses considering entering the American market).
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At the same time, from a doctrinal perspective, this situation cre-
ates exactly the situation that Justices with nearly all perspectives on
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence have routinely said they were
seeking to avoid: placing potential defendants in a situation where
they are unsure whether they will be subject to liability. Placing de-
fendants in this situation does not comport with the traditional no-
tions of fairness that personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause is supposed to be based upon. In other words, the uncertainty
created by the Court's inability to reach a consensus on this issue may
itself be creating violations of defendants' due process rights.
A. International Companies Seeking Entry to the US Market and
Their Domestic Distributors Cannot Apportion the Risk of Liability
Between Themselves or Incorporate the Costs of Risk Into Their
Products Without a Clearer Rule
Lack of clarity about personal jurisdiction rules creates a lack of
clarity about the risk of liability that a manufacturer or distributor will
be subject to because of variations in the product liability law and
related procedure of different forums. Although it is true in theory
that the choice of the forum for a lawsuit does not necessarily require
the application of that forum's law, in practice the choice of forum has
a substantial effect on the choice of law and ultimately the outcome of
product liability suits. 18 8 Most obviously, different jurisdictions have
different choice-of-law rules, so the choice of forum in that sense liter-
ally dictates the choice of law.189 Moreover, "most choice-of-law
methodologies are relatively malleable, and many commentators have
noted that judges frequently conclude that choice-of-law principles re-
quire application of the forum state's substantive law."190 Even if a
forum does choose to apply another state's law, it will still apply its
own procedural rules,191 which can have a substantial impact on liabil-
ity and the extent of damages.192 Finally, judicial selection methods
188. See Klerman, supra note 111, at 1566.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1566 n.50.
191. See, e.g., GEORGE W. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWs 133 (3d ed. 1963).
192. See Klerman, supra note 111, at 1566. For example, some states limit the availability of
punitive damages, and one state and many foreign jurisdictions disallow them altogether. See,
e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(3) (limiting punitive damages awards to $250,000 or three
times the compensatory damages award); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (limiting punitive damages
awards to $50,000 or three times the compensatory damages award); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
38.1. (2010) (limiting punitive damages awards to $350,000 regardless of the compensatory dam-
ages award); Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590 (Wash. 1996) (noting that puni-
tive damages are not available under Washington law); Jessica J. Berch, The Need for
Enforcement of U.S. Punitive Damages Awards by the European Union, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 55,
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and the composition of juries vary from forum to forum, which can
also have a substantial impact on the outcome of a case. 193 Thus, the
lack of clear jurisdictional rules leaves companies that sell across state
and international boundaries unable to determine the degree of liabil-
ity they may be opening themselves up to with their conduct.
This uncertainty is economically troublesome for at least three rea-
sons. First, international manufacturers are unable to apportion the
risk of liability appropriately between themselves and domestic dis-
tributors without knowing the types of liability risks to which they are
being subjected. Second, companies may not appropriately account
for the risk of liability in setting their prices, undermining the signal-
ing effect product liability rules are supposed to create for consumers.
Third, companies may not be able to appropriately account for the
differing risks of liability created by different state tort and procedural
law regimes.
1. Personal Jurisdiction Uncertainty Impedes Efficient Transactions
Between Distributors and Manufacturers
When an international company wants to distribute its products in
the United States, it is often easiest for that company to work through
a domestic distributor. 194 Domestic distribution of foreign products is
78 (noting that no European Union countries other than the United Kingdom allow the award of
punitive damages). Additionally, states have widely divergent standards for determining the
admissibility of expert testimony-an issue that often has a determinative impact on product
liability litigation. Compare McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257,264-65 (Tenn. 1997)
(noting that differences in the Tennessee Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence
required the adoption of a heightened standard for the admissibility of expert testimony: "This
distinction indicates that the probative force of the testimony must be stronger before it is admit-
ted in Tennessee.") with State v. Swope, 762 N.W.2d 725, 730-32 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (applying
a "relevancy test" that is less strict than Daubert to the admissibility of expert testimony); see,
e.g., Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH S59,
S59 (2005) (noting that the outcome of a Daubert motion can be dispositive in many civil cases).
193. Klerman, supra note 111, at 1566. Indeed, Justice Breyer's opinion in Nicastro recognizes
that there are wide disparities in how states apply their products liability laws in practice. See J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd., v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (2006) (Breyer, J. concurring) (noting
that in one study the percentage of plaintiff winners in tort trials among forty-six populous coun-
ties, ranged from 17.9% (in Worcester, Massachusetts) to 69.1% (in Milwaukee, Wisconsin))
(citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN
LARGE COUNTIEs, 2001 11 (2004), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ttvlcOl.pdf).
194. See Amit K. Ghosh, W. Benoy Joseph, John T. Gardner & Sharon V. Thach, Understand-
ing Industrial Distributors' Expectations of Benefits from Relationships with Suppliers, 19 J. Bus.
& INDUS. MARKETING 433, 434 (noting that "[t]he status of distributors has risen almost continu-
ously over the past few decades as they increase their domination over the sales channel. The
reduction of trade barriers and the resultant increase in potential suppliers has further enhanced
the nature of vertical competition, thereby increasing the importance of distributors") (citations
omitted).
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a multi-billion dollar business in the United States.195 Unclear per-
sonal jurisdiction rules can present a problem for distributors and
manufacturers in this system because of the existence of strict liability
combined with joint and several liability in product liability cases.
Because of strict product liability rules, manufacturers and their dis-
tributors can both be on the hook for a plaintiff's injuries in a product
liability case.196 In a case in which the manufacturer and the distribu-
tor are both subject to personal jurisdiction, the burden of defending
such a claim-and of paying any settlement or judgment-will fall on
both the manufacturer and the distributor. Conversely, in a case in
which the manufacturer cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction,
such as in Nicastro, the distributor is left holding the bag and must
take the entire burden of defending the claim-and of potential liabil-
ity-onto its own shoulders.
In a world in which the Nicastro dissent's "expectations" based test
is applied, the former situation would occur much more often.197 In a
world in which the Nicastro plurality's test is applied, the latter situa-
tion would be more common. 198 If the "expectations" test were the
law, manufacturers and distributors would likely buy an amount of
liability insurance coverage consummate with the risks of defending
these claims (but not doing so alone). If the plurality's test were the
law, distributors would either have to purchase more liability insur-
ance-and pass these costs onto consumers and/or demand lower
prices from manufacturers-or seek broad indemnification clauses in
purchase contracts with foreign manufacturers.
Unfortunately, distributors and manufacturers do not live in either
of these worlds. Instead, they must continue these transactions in an
environment in which the manufacturer's level of exposure to per-
sonal jurisdiction-and by extension, liability-is unclear. Because of
this, negotiations between manufacturers and distributors will be im-
peded, and deals will be made that may ultimately turn out to have
been inefficient. Distributors may end up holding the bag when they
195. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Goods Trade:
Imports & Exports by Related-Parties 2012, at 4 (May 2, 2013), available at http://www.census.
gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2012pr/aip/related-party/rpl2.pdf (noting that there were over
one trillion dollars worth of goods imported into the United States in 2012 by non-related par-
ties-nearly fifty percent of the total imports for that year).
196. See, e.g., JAMEs A. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAw § 32.64 (1977).
197. Indeed, it would seem that it would almost always work that way assuming that the man-
ufacturer had some understanding of the territory in which the distributor was selling its
products.
198. However, it would not necessarily always be that way because a manufacturer could take
specific actions that would subject it to jurisdiction in a given forum, such as specifically directing
a distributor to target a specific state or advertising in that state independently of the distributor.
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did not, and could not, anticipate doing so. Or, manufacturers may
have to pay twice for the risk of liability-once by having to sell to a
distributor at lower prices to account for the distributor's risk of being
subject to liability alone and again if it turns out that the manufacturer
is actually subject to suit after all.
2. Unclear Personal Jurisdiction Rules Weaken Pricing Signals,
Reflecting Product Safety
Another problem with this uncertainty is that it undermines one of
the core purposes of tort liability in general, and strict product liability
in particular: building the riskiness of a product into its price as a sig-
nal to consumers. 199 Most people lack information about the safety of
consumer products. However, product liability suits force manufac-
turers to either change their products to make them safer or raise the
prices of their products to reflect the risk of liability that those prod-
ucts carry. When manufacturers do that, consumers can make optimal
purchasing decisions without knowing technical information about
product safety because the price they pay will reflect the full cost of
the product, including its risk of causing harm.200
Because uncertain jurisdictional rules make it difficult for distribu-
tors and manufacturers to properly apportion the risk of liability be-
tween themselves, the ultimate result will likely be that products' end
prices to consumers may be increased to account for this uncertainty.
This price increase will not be a signal of anything other than the diffi-
culty of doing business in an uncertain legal environment, which may
drown out any price signaling that would differentiate products based
on the actual level of risk associated with them.
3. Unclear Personal Jurisdiction Rules Weaken Pricing Signals,
Reflecting Variations in State Laws
The current regime-or lack thereof-also undermines another set
of pricing signals: those associated with different states' product liabil-
ity rules. Because different states have different substantive and pro-
cedural rules governing liability, some states will expose
manufacturers to more exacting scrutiny of their products by the court
system. This increased scrutiny has two primary effects in these juris-
dictions: increased costs for manufacturers and increased safety of
consumer products. When manufacturers raise their prices-or aban-
don a jurisdiction altogether-in response to such rules, it gives con-
199. Buehler, supra note 90, at 123.
200. Id.
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sumers a signal that they are paying for the higher safety level
imposed by their state's law. By reading these signals, consumers can
balance the level of consumer protection they desire with the pricing
and availability of products they want by choosing what jurisdictions
to purchase products in and where to live.201
Just like the direct signaling of product safety, signals about state
law are only effective if manufacturers and consumers are able to pre-
dict with some reliability which laws and which courts will govern each
purchase. For the reasons discussed above in Part IV.A, being subject
to personal jurisdiction in a state results in the application of that
state's procedural rules and often results in being subject to the sub-
stantive law of that state as well. Because of the uncertainty that cur-
rently exists in this area, manufacturers will often be unable to build
the price of different states' tort laws into their products because they
will not know whether they can be subject to personal jurisdiction in
that state. Thus, as long as the "stream of commerce" doctrine re-
mains undefined, consumers will not get the benefit of the pricing sig-
nals reflecting state law differences. Instead, consumers may end up
paying for consumer protections that they are not getting if a manu-
facturer erroneously believes it will be subject to jurisdiction in a par-
ticular state and raises prices on that basis. Conversely,
manufacturers may be unexpectedly subject to liability that they were
unable to price into their products. Thus, bringing clarity to the
stream of commerce theory would provide positive economic benefits
by removing the cloud of uncertainty hanging over consumers, distrib-
utors, and manufacturers.
201. Just like consumers without adequate information about product safety can benefit from
price-signaling, so too can consumers without adequate information about applicable legal rules
benefit from price signaling. Consumers lacking information about comparative tort law regimes
are likely to be even more common than those with little knowledge of relative product safety.
See Klerman, supra note 111, at 1572-74 (noting that it would be "absurd" to suggest that "con-
sumers . . . have detailed knowledge of the laws and procedures of the relevant states so that
they could figure out how each state's laws and procedures impact the amount they would be
willing to pay for [a] product and so that they could make informed choices between competing
products. . . . Very few tort professors could tell you whether Ohio or Colorado has more
favorable product liability law, much less put a dollar amount on the difference. In addition, it is
simply not worth anyone's time to figure out the relevant laws and their impacts. The
probability of an actionable accident for any mass-produced product is negligible, so it would be
irrational for any consumer to spend the time to read a forum-selection clause much less re-
search the relevant state's laws or try to calculate how those laws affect their valuation of the
product.").
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B. Due Process Requires a Clear Rule
Economic concerns aside, the lack of a clear rule on the stream of
commerce test creates a level of uncertainty that is itself a violation of
the due process principles that have formed the underpinning of mod-
ern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The Court has emphasized
that predictability for the defendant is an important part of what
makes the assertion of personal jurisdiction fair. Indeed, this animat-
ing principle underlies both the Nicastro plurality and dissent's ap-
proach to the stream of commerce test. However, by declining to
choose between these competing approaches, the Court has under-
mined this principle by creating the exact unpredictability that an
overwhelming majority of the current Court (and its members since
International Shoe) has agreed is unacceptable under the Due Process
Clause.
Ever since the introduction of the minimum contacts test in Interna-
tional Shoe, the Court has emphasized that whether a defendant sub-
jects itself to personal jurisdiction should be, on some level, entirely
within the defendant's control.202 Even prior to the International Shoe
era of personal jurisdiction, the doctrine has always been aimed at
allowing the defendant to make a choice to submit to personal juris-
diction. Under the prior regime, a defendant could do that simply by
choosing whether to be physically present in the forum.203 "Histori-
cally, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam [was]
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence
his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequi-
site to its rendition of a judgment personally binding [on] him."204
This system was justified in part because the defendant "voluntarily
entered [the forum and] . . . has no one but himself to blame" for
being subject to suit there.205
The modern stream of commerce debate focuses on the type of con-
trol that a defendant exercises (i.e., taking actions that foreseeably
202. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
203. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(noting the historical practice of states exercising jurisdiction over any defendant who is physi-
cally present in the state).
204. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
205. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 625; Id. at 635-36 ("[H]owever murky the jurisprudential origins of
transient jurisdiction, the fact that American courts have announced the rule for perhaps a cen-
tury (first in dicta, more recently in holdings) provides a defendant voluntarily present in a par-
ticular State today 'clear notice that [he] is subject to suit' in the forum." World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). In keeping with this justification,
states traditionally exempted from valid service defendants who were coerced into entering the
state. See id at 613.
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could lead to a product being sold in a forum versus taking actions
that are directly targeted to a forum), but all sides agree that the de-
fendant's choices should ultimately underlie the personal jurisdiction
inquiry. The debate is really just over what types of choices are
relevant.
The Court recognized as much in two of its seminal personal juris-
diction opinions, World-Wide Volkswagen and Burger King. In
World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court emphasized that subjecting the
defendant to jurisdiction in Oklahoma would not comport with due
process because one of the primary purposes of the Due Process
Clause, "ensuring the orderly administration of the laws," would be
undermined by creating a system in which defendants were unable to
"structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
[whether] that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." 20 6
Two of the three dissenters also agreed with the majority on the
importance of allowing the defendant to structure its primary conduct
to control its amenability to suit in a particular forum.20 7 Although
they would have held that the act of selling a mobile product and be-
ing part of a national chain of dealerships was sufficient conduct to
subject the defendant to jurisdiction in Oklahoma, the dissenters still
understood due process as requiring that the defendant be put on no-
tice that the defendant's activities could cause the defendant to be
subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.2 0 8
In Burger King, a case that approved the exercise of jurisdiction by
Florida courts over a Michigan franchisee of a Florida corporation,
the Court made the importance of predictability in the personal juris-
diction inquiry even more clear. The Court began its analysis by not-
ing that the due process clause requires that potential defendants
"have 'fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.' "2 0 9 In Burger King, the Court
206. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (internal quotations omitted).
207. See id. at 316 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The exception was Justice Brennan who argued
for a rule based on the contacts between both parties and the forum, where the defendant's
contacts with the forum would not necessarily be decisive. See id. at 309-10 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). However, by the time he wrote the opinion of the Court in Burger King, Justice Bren-
nan apparently came to agree that a defendant should be able to choose, through its actions,
which forums it will be subject to jurisdiction in. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 475-76 (1985).
208. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A] local auto-
mobile dealer who makes himself part of a nationwide network of dealerships can fairly expect
that the cars they sell may cause injury in distant States and that they may be called on to defend
a resulting lawsuit there.").
209. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (alteration in original)).
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held that the franchisee could be subject to jurisdiction in Florida be-
cause he had "deliberately reached out" to the Florida corporation to
enter into the franchise agreement, making it reasonably foreseeable
that he would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida if a dispute
arose out of that agreement. 210
Thus, concerns about predictability have long been important to the
personal jurisdiction inquiry. Yet, the concurrence's indecision in Ni-
castro has left manufacturers in a situation in which, even with the
help of sophisticated lawyers, they cannot structure their primary con-
duct to avoid or accept liability in particular forums. Instead, they are
relegated to guessing whether courts in a particular jurisdiction will
apply the plurality's approach, the dissent's approach, or some combi-
nation of the two. This state of affairs neither ensures "the fair and
orderly administration of the laws," 211 nor gives defendants "fair
warning that [their] activit[ies] may subject [them] to the jurisdiction
of a foreign sovereign." 212
V. EITHER THE PLURALITY OR THE DISSENT'S APPROACH CAN BE
READILY APPLIED TO THE "MODERN" ISSUES THAT
TROUBLED THE CONCURRENCE
The concurrence's primary justification 213 for declining to settle the
stream of commerce issue was that making such a choice was inappro-
priate in Nicastro because the case did not "implicate modern con-
cerns. "214 These modern concerns include situations in which a
company "targets the world by selling products from its Web site" or
"consigns the products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com)
210. Id. at 479 (internal quotation omitted).
211. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
212. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also S. Wilson Quick, Comment,
Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, McIntyre, and the Ship of Personal Juris-
diction, 37 N.C. J. Iwr'L L. & COM. REG. 547, 550 (2012) ("The lack of predictability resulting
from the state of jurisdictional analysis is inefficient and diametrically opposed to due process.").
213. The concurrence also mentioned that it might be more appropriate to settle the issue in a
case where the Solicitor General participated. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring). This objection is puzzling. The fate of the stream of
commerce doctrine will primarily impact the ability of state courts to adjudicate disputes arising
under state law, not federal courts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (allowing the assertion of personal
jurisdiction in lawsuits arising under federal law where "the defendant is not subject to jurisdic-
tion in any state's courts of general jurisdiction"); Brief of Arkansas et al. as Amici Curiae In
Support of Respondents at 1, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-
1343) 2010 WL 5192281, at *1 (noting the states' "interest in the articulation of a clear rule
governing personal jurisdiction in the products liability context to provide guidance to our courts
and our citizens"). Moreover, nothing about Nicastro prevented the Court from calling for the
Solicitor General's views in that case.
214. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792. (Breyer, J., concurring).
A FORK IN THE STREAM
who then receives and fulfills the orders" or "markets its products
through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a fo-
rum." 2 15 In the concurrence's view, without a case that presented
such concerns, it would be inappropriate to "work such a change to
the law in the way either the plurality or the New Jersey Supreme
Court suggest[ed.]"216
On the surface, this seems like a reasonable and pragmatic ap-
proach, but a closer examination reveals that this hesitation is unjusti-
fied. As the plurality points out, common law processes always work
by establishing broad principles that are then adapted to specific situa-
tions, such as the ones the concurrence is concerned with:
The conclusion that the authority to subject a defendant to judg-
ment depends on purposeful availment, consistent with Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, does not by itself resolve many diffi-
cult questions of jurisdiction that will arise in particular cases. The
defendant's conduct and the economic realities of the market the
defendant seeks to serve will differ across cases, and judicial exposi-
tion will, in common-law fashion, clarify the contours of that
principle. 217
More importantly, there are specific reasons to expect that choosing
between the competing approaches to the stream of commerce theory
would not present a problem with respect to the modern concerns
identified by the concurrence. Lower courts have already successfully
applied both versions of the stream of commerce test to the e-com-
merce situations that gave the concurrence pause. The outcomes of
these cases suggest that the plurality and dissent's approaches actually
would not differ as much in their application to e-commerce issues as
they would in their application to more traditional cases like Nicastro.
Although one can imagine-as the concurrence does-cases involving
the Internet where the stream of commerce rule would be decisive,
these situations do not call for a fundamentally different analysis than
the one called for in Nicastro.
A. Application of the Stream of Commerce Test is Usually Distinct
from Issues Presented by the Internet
Courts adopting both approaches to the stream of commerce test
appear to approach Internet commerce the same way: by making a
distinction between websites that are "passive" and websites that are
215. Id. at 2793.
216. Id. at 2794.
217. Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
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"interactive." 2 1 8 Websites simply presenting information about a busi-
ness that do not provide any option for communication or commerce
between the user and the business are usually not considered "con-
tacts" with any particular forum.219 Conversely, websites allowing the
user to communicate with the company-for example, by purchasing
products-are considered significant "contacts" for purposes of the
personal jurisdiction inquiry.220 The stream of commerce test is usu-
ally, at most, ancillary to these cases, which focus on objective charac-
teristics of the websites at issue, rather than on the defendants'
awareness or intention.
For example, in Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 221 the Seventh Cir-
cuit, which applies Justice Brennan's Asahi approach,222 affirmed a
district court's finding that Indiana lacked personal jurisdiction over a
Danish manufacturer of a jack that allegedly caused the plaintiff's
death at his workplace.223 The defendant sold its products into the
United States through a distributor in Florida, although the record did
not reflect any sales into Indiana or the volume of total sales through
the distributor.224 The defendant also maintained a website, in En-
glish, that was accessible throughout the United States. 225 The web-
site contained information about the defendant's products and contact
218. See Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 549-50 (7th Cir. 2004). This test ap-
pears to have originated from Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). See David Swetnam-Burland & Stacy 0. Stitham, Back to the Future:
Revisiting Zippo in Light of "Modem Concerns", 29 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 231,
236-40 (2011).
219. See, e.g., Jennings, 383 F.3d at 550 ("[A] defendant's maintenance of a passive website
does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over that defendant in a particular forum
just because the website can be accessed there."); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consul-
tants, 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting personal jurisdiction over a corporation whose
internet contacts with the forum were "at most, passive").
220. See, e.g., ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 (D.S.C. 1999)
(describing the "sliding scale" of interactivity between websites doing "nothing more than adver-
tis[ing] its product on the Internet" and websites "in which individuals enter into contracts with
[companies] via the Internet").
221. Jennings, 383 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2004)
222. See Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Sullivan v.
Author Solutions, Inc., No. 07-C-1137, 2008 WL 2937786, at *4 n.9 (E.D. Wis. July 23, 2008)
(finding the assertion of personal jurisdiction appropriate because "[hiere, defendant placed its
books into the stream of commerce by delegating its printing and sales functions to its printers
and distributors. Defendant expected that the books printed and distributed by these entities
would be distributed in all of the states they serviced").
223. See Jennings, 383 F.3d at 552.
224. See id. at 548. Although it was clear that the jack at issue in the case was manufactured
by the defendant, the record did not clearly reflect whether the jack was sold into Indiana
through the distributor, directly from the manufacturer, or through some other channel. See id.
225. Id.
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information but did not allow consumers to place orders directly
through the website.226
The plaintiff argued that the website was sufficient to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction in Indiana since it was essentially
soliciting business from anywhere, including Indiana, by being accessi-
ble from anywhere and by being available in English.227 The court
rejected that argument as "sweep[ing] too broadly" since "it is unu-
sual to find a company that does not maintain at least a passive web-
site [so] [piremising personal jurisdiction on the maintenance of a
website, without requiring some level of 'interactivity' between the
defendant and consumers in the forum state would create almost uni-
versal personal jurisdiction."2 2 8 The court found that since the defen-
dant's website allowed for no interaction at all and instead just made
information available, it could not be a sufficient contact to support
the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Indiana.229
Separately, the court rejected the argument that an undetermined
number of sales to the Florida distributor could support personal ju-
risdiction in Indiana because of a lack of evidence presented by the
plaintiff regarding how the jack at issue in the case got to Indiana and
what the volume of sales was from the distributor to Indiana.230
Similarly, in Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH,231 a district court, in a
jurisdiction that has adopted Justice O'Connor's Asahi approach,232
rejected the assertion of personal jurisdiction by South Carolina
against a German manufacturer of paper shredders.233 The plaintiff in
that case asserted a product liability claim against the manufacturer
because of injuries she sustained from a paper shredder in her father's
office.234 The manufacturer sold its products to an American distribu-
tor,235 who then sold the shredders to a third company, which sold the
shredder at issue to the plaintiff's father's employer. 236 The plaintiff
argued that the defendant was aware that its shredders could end up
in South Carolina and that the "additional conduct" requirement of
226. Id.
227. Jennings, 383 F.3d at 549.
228. Id. at 549-50.
229. Id. at 550.
230. Id. at 550-51.
231. Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH, 69 F. Supp. 2d 770 (D.S.C. 1999).
232. See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 944-46 (4th Cir. 1994).
233. Brown, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 779.
234. Id. at 772.
235. Although the case does not explicitly mention where the distributor was based, it is ap-
parent from the court's analysis that the distributor must have been based in a state other than
South Carolina.
236. Brown, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 773-74.
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Justice O'Connor's Asahi test was satisfied by the defendant maintain-
ing a website accessible to South Carolina consumers, which the plain-
tiff attempted to equate with advertising in South Carolina. 237
The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the website at is-
sue was a "passive" website that only presented information about the
defendant's products and contact information. 238 The court noted
that there was no evidence that the defendant had done anything to
encourage South Carolina consumers to visit the website or that a sub-
stantial number of them had done so.239 Thus, the court concluded
that there was no evidence "that this web site was directed at South
Carolina any more than any other place in the world. Consequently,
... [the defendant's] web site cannot provide the basis for an assertion
of personal jurisdiction." 240
As these cases show, the issue of how websites impact the personal
jurisdiction inquiry is analytically distinct from the issue of how to ap-
ply the stream of commerce test to the use of a distribution network,
even when both issues are present in the same case. In both Jennings
and Brown, each court looked at a passive website and applied the
same test to reach the same conclusion, even though each jurisdiction
applies a different version of the stream of commerce doctrine. The
courts in Jennings and Brown did differ in the sense that the court in
Jennings analyzed the website at issue as another potential contact to
support jurisdiction, while the court in Brown analyzed the website in
that case as a potential "something more" under Justice O'Connor's
version of the stream of commerce test. However, both courts applied
the same, relatively well-settled 241 approach to the actual determina-
tion of the websites' impact by looking at objective characteristics of
the websites in question: specifically, the level of interaction each
website fostered with forum state consumers. Thus, making a choice
between the competing approaches to the stream of commerce from
237. Id. at 777.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 777-78.
240. Id. at 778.
241. Many have argued that the Zippo interactivity test is outmoded and should be replaced.
See, e.g., Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 217, at 238-43. However, even if the interac-
tivity test were replaced with something else, that analysis would likely focus either on other
characteristics of the defendant's web presence or on other contacts the defendant makes with
the forum in the non-virtual world. See id. at 249-50 (suggesting treating the internet as just
another method of making a "contact" for purposes of personal jurisdiction, rather than as a
contact in itself). Such an analysis would still be distinct from the fundamental question of
whether the manufacturing defendant must intentionally send its products directly to a particular
forum, or whether the manufacturing defendant's knowledge that a product is likely to end up in
that forum is sufficient.
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Asahi and Nicastro would make very little difference to the analysis of
Internet issues in personal jurisdiction cases.
B. Either Version of the Stream of Commerce Test is Readily
Applicable to E-Commerce
The concurrence presents a few hypothetical situations that purport
to explain why modern concerns must be present in a case deciding
the stream of commerce question; however, none of these are persua-
sive. The most obvious type of situation in which the applicable
stream of commerce test might be outcome determinative in an e-
commerce case is one in which a manufacturer sells its product over
the Internet through a third party, such as Amazon or eBay. While
this situation, on its surface, seems to present a novel question of
"modern concerns," it is not fundamentally different from what hap-
pened in Nicastro itself.
The manufacturer in such a situation is using Amazon or eBay as its
"distributor" and is targeting the United States as a whole-since the
Internet is accessible from anywhere- just as J. McIntyre did in a
more traditional way by hiring its domestic distributor. As demon-
strated by the discussion above, third party distributors, like Amazon
and eBay, would be subject to jurisdiction under the approach the
Courts of Appeal have taken to Internet commerce in any state since
they maintain interactive websites. Whether the manufacturer could
be subject to jurisdiction would turn on exactly the same issues as
whether J. McIntyre could be subject to jurisdiction in Nicastro.
While the answers the plurality and the dissent give to that question
diverge sharply, the answer is clear under either approach. A manu-
facturer who provides its products to a third party seller who in turn
sells those products over the Internet to a purchaser in a particular
state would not be subject to personal jurisdiction under the plural-
ity's approach unless the manufacturer took some other action to spe-
cifically target that particular state, such as advertising its products in
that state or designing its products for use in that state. Conversely,
under the dissent's approach, because a manufacturer could reasona-
bly expect that a product being sold over the Internet by a third party
could end up in any state, the manufacturer would be subject to juris-
diction in any state where the product was sold, without taking any
additional action to target that state. Thus, the issue presented in Ni-
castro regarding the stream of commerce test is independent from the
issue of how to deal with issues presented by the Internet.
Finally, the concurrence suggests that, especially when applied to an
Internet-based third party distributor, the plurality and dissent's ap-
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proaches could each lead to extreme and undesirable consequences in
particular cases. In critiquing the plurality, the concurrence implies
that a corporation targeting its products "[to] the world" through a
third party Internet distributor could get away with not being subject
to jurisdiction in any state because there would be no purposeful
targeting of any given state.242 In critiquing the dissent, the concur-
rence suggests that a hapless small manufacturer, such as an Appa-
lachian potter, who sells its products to a large national distributor
could be forced to defend lawsuits in "virtually every" jurisdiction in
the United States.243 Neither of these critiques should have prevented
the concurrence from fashioning a rule for at least two reasons.
First, as with any clear legal rule, a clear stream of commerce rule
would occasionally produce results that do not seem fair. Neverthe-
less, this occasional unfairness is far outweighed by the unfairness cre-
ated by a lack of any rule at all. Once a clear rule is set and businesses
and consumers are able to structure their primary conduct to avoid or
account for the situations in which companies will be subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction, such unfair situations will become less common.
Second, and more importantly, both approaches have sufficient
flexibility to prevent-or at least potentially prevent-these seem-
ingly unjust outcomes. When a corporation employs a distributor-
over the Internet or otherwise-to target the United States as a
whole, the plurality specifically left the door open to a legislative solu-
tion, suggesting that "[i]t may be that ... Congress could authorize the
exercise of jurisdiction in" federal courts for state law claims against
defendants with sufficient contacts with the United States as a
whole.244 Thus, to deal with corporations that target the United States
as a whole, Congress could pass a statute empowering federal courts
to hear those cases.245 And, of course, at least in the products liability
context, in most states the injured consumer would still have the op-
tion of suing the distributor.246
As for the hypothetical Appalachian potter in a world governed by
the dissent's approach, the concurrence forgets that the stream of
commerce test only deals with the first half of the personal jurisdiction
242. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
243. Id. at 2794.
244. Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
245. Another potential legislative solution is to require foreign manufacturers to consent to
jurisdiction in a particular state as a condition of selling goods into the United States. Several
bills have been introduced to that effect. See, e.g., H.R. 3646, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 4678,
111th Cong. (2010); S. 1606, 111th Cong. (2009).
246. See, e.g., DOOLEY, supra note 195, § 32.64.
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inquiry: whether the defendant has the requisite minimum contacts
with the forum to be subject to jurisdiction in that forum. The second
prong of the test, whether the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular
case is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, would still have to be satisfied even when minimum contacts
were established through the stream of commerce test.
Indeed, Asahi itself is an illustration of this principal. While Justice
Brennan took the broader expectations or awareness-based approach
to the stream of commerce test, he and the three other Justices joining
him agreed that the assertion of personal jurisdiction was still inappro-
priate in that case because it would not comport with traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice to hale the Japanese part
manufacturer into court in California, in part because of the "severe"
burden such a defense would place on the defendant. 247 Such an ap-
proach would probably yield similar results for the Appalachian pot-
ter Justice Breyer's concurrence is concerned about.248
Thus, either approach to the stream of commerce test would be
readily applicable to cases involving modern technology and would
apply to that area in much the same way as they would apply to cases
not involving such technology. Moreover, each test has either built-in
or legislatively available mechanisms to prevent unfair results being
created by their application to e-commerce cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fairness and efficiency have always been concerns at the heart of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence since International Shoe. Yet, as
the stream of commerce test currently stands, personal jurisdiction is
uniquely unfair to certain businesses and consumers who are left in
uncertainty as to what conduct will subject a business to jurisdiction.
Such uncertainty is not just unfair; it is also economically detrimental
since so much of today's commerce flows through international
channels.
247. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 114 (1987).
248. Indeed, as discussed in Part III, the dissent in Nicastro elaborated on this point to suggest
a distinction between "cases involving a substantially local plaintiff, like Nicastro, injured by the
activity of a defendant engaged in interstate or international trade [where jurisdiction presuma-
bly would be consistent with fair play and substantial justice] and . . . cases in which the defen-
dant is a natural or legal person whose economic activities and legal involvements are largely
home-based, i.e., entities without designs to gain substantial revenue from sales in distant mar-
kets." Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested that this
approach "would, to a considerable extent, answer the concerns expressed by Justice Breyer."
Id. at 2804 n.18.
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While adapting personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to products
flowing through the international "stream of commerce" is a chal-
lenge, the Supreme Court laid out two clear and relatively easily ap-
plied approaches to the problem in Asahi and Nicastro. As
demonstrated above, the concurrence's refusal to choose between the
two approaches in Nicastro because of imagined "modern concerns"
was both destructive and unnecessary. Next time the Supreme Court
confronts the stream of commerce, hopefully it will not engage in such
faux restraint and will instead finally choose one of the clear ap-
proaches available to address this problem.
